Published in Maclean's Magazine, March 10, 2003 (edition date: March 17) New York For a man who's been losing sleep and running hard, trying to sell Canada's suggested compromise on Iraq, Paul Heinbecker appears to be relishing the day ahead. "First I'll look in on the Mexicans and the French and the Russians," he says, "and find out what their thinking is today." Canada's Ambassador to the U.N. has been attempting to excite the diplomatic marketplace with the prospect of that sorrowfully discounted ideal, peace. In this hothouse of global push and persuasion and posturing, the Cretien government's proposal has stalled ("not getting traction" in diplomat-speak), yet Heinbecker shows not a trace of discouragement. "The plan's heart is still beating, and our best hope is that when people come to the edge of the abyss, they'll decide they'd rather find another way." That other way would unite the Security Council midway between the Bush administration's invasion plans and the insistence of France, among others, that the U.N.'s weapons inspectors should have much more time to try to peacefully disarm Saddam Hussein. The primary goal: to prevent a disastrous split in the council, should the U.S. and Britain table a potentially divisive second resolution authorizing war. "Our ideas are not rocket science, but we did think of them first and with our timing we caught a wave of interest. On one hand our document allows the possibility of a war, but there's also a decision to be made first -- a judgement on Iraqi co-operation on disarmament -- and a deadline for authorising the use of force. Some people have said our deadline is too close to the U.S. timeline, but we've anticipated that by saying that the security council itself should establish another date if necessary." Working from their smart offices two blocks from the U.N., Heinbecker's team of a dozen Canadian political officers and advisers have managed to elbow their way to the centre of the Iraq debate, emerging as the most influential mission of the 176 nations not represented on the security council. The reason: early on, Canada's concept was the best alternative considered by the ten non-permanent members of the council, countries the U.S. has been lobbying intensely for their support of a second resolution. It's been an effective, well co-ordinated campaign, the Ambassador says, with Prime Minister Cretien contributing strong leadership and some stalwart personal diplomacy of his own. While Heinbecker acknowledges that his team's document might not, in the end, be adopted, it has stimulated the search for consensus. The British, for instance, have unveiled their own amendment to a second resolution. It takes the Canadian approach but with a deadline even closer to the U.S. timeframe for war: March 17th. "We're getting a lot less sleep, I can assure you," says one of Heinbecker's diplomats of the pace and tension of negotiations. "But we're an activist country, we're regarded as being very engaged here and I don't think it came as a suprise to anyone in the security council that Canada should put forward the proposal we have. The process is time consuming, it's true. But out of innate Canadian-ness, we see it as a healthy thing -- we're here to make sure there's a future for multi-lateralism among nations, that the security council survives past this current crisis. The issue before us is basically this: if you have the strongest nation on the globe dissing the institution of global exchange and stability, how do you counter that ?" The climate around the U.N. is palpably foul, with reports of spying on swing-vote U.N. missions by America's National Security Agency, seeking further advantage for the Bush administration and its diplomatic arm-twisters. Chile has demanded an investigation. Meantime the U.S. this week expelled two security guards from the Iraqi mission to the U.N., claiming that a total of 300 Iraqis serving as diplomats at embassies around the world are in fact intelligence operatives plotting against US interests. These intrigues further embittered the contentious political atmosphere in New York, where the cold rain seemed as grim and relentless as the U.S. administration's insistence on military action without delay. "Why do so many Americans support the Bush plan, and why are they angered by other nations' protests ?" asks one Canadian diplomat (who explains that only Ambassador Heinbecker may comment for the record). "It's mainly because President Bush managed to link the Iraq issue to counter-terrorism, and the American public is simply hurt by suggestions the world doesn't want to support the U.S. against terror." A colleague adds: "There are voices within the current U.S. administration who don't see any purpose in the United Nations. They believe this is the 'American Historical Moment' and that the U.S. shouldn't be tangled up by the U.N." In noting this trend, foreign diplomats are not alone in expressing anxiety at the Bush administration's bullish disregard for other nations' reluctance to go to war. Prominent American statesmen, too, worry that George W. Bush is storming recklessly into a maze of blind alleys, politically, militarily and economically speaking. "This is a different style of leadership, and if it continues we're going to see reactions that won't be good for the U.S.," says Lee Hamilton, president of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. "I believe we've seen these reactions already in election results from Brazil to South Korea to Germany. Clearly, around the world, there's a lot of resentment. This president's policies are blunt, his rhetoric is quite divisive. There's a lack of patience in the Bush administration -- they've made up their minds to give it another couple of weeks, but they really don't want to give diplomacy a second chance." Hamilton is a former centrist-Democrat and was chairman of the House oversight committee on foreign affairs. As head of the Woodrow Wilson Center, he speaks for the institutional conscience of American diplomacy: the Wilson Center was set up to foster its namesake-president's quest for effective, consensus building international relations, and it receives significant annual funding by the U.S. government. The Center's website features an essay by Hamilton that includes this stark warning: "A desperate Saddam Hussein could use a scorched earth policy that includes attacks on Israel, the Kurds and other internal opposition. The worst-case scenario is that he is able to use chemical and biological weapons to inflict severe casualties on civilians or American troops. The Iraqi army may also be positioned in heavily populated areas, inviting civilian casualties from U.S. strikes. The American people have simply not been prepared for the possibility of substantial U.S. casualties or civilian deaths in a war that may involve chemical and biological weaponry." Hamilton told Maclean's: "The President is less concerned about the uneasiness his policies are creating than other presidents have been. This group in the White House is very confident about American power, that it's good for the world as well as their own interests. The main consequence is that you're probably creating a lot of Osama bin Ladens out there. The long term consequences of power used arrogantly is hard to measure, but what happened in Turkey (the refusal to allow transit to Iraq for U.S. forces) is not surprising. Allies and friends may not be as willing to step forward and co-operate with us in future." Not so, claimed the administration this week, and for proof of its dexterity in maintaining cooperation abroad, the White House pointed gleefully at the arrest in Pakistan of al Qaeda kingpin Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, together with moneyhandler Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi. By mid-week, however, the official U.S. line that the arrests were the result of a joint U.S.-Pakistani intelligence operation was being scorned by espionage analysts in both countries, and an unseemly scrap ensued among the various police and intelligence agencies who claimed a share of credit for this rare counter-terrorist coup. Maclean's has learned from a police source in Pakistan that at one point during the melee of claims and counterclaims, Pakistani officials considered releasing a formal rebuttal of Washington's assertion that American case officers had been key to the operation. The Pakistanis' version of events is backed up by at least one well-placed observer within Washington's intelligence community. The source told Maclean's: "It's pretty disgusting, really, because the truth is that this was a Pakistani operation through and through, really basic gumshoe stuff. It wasn't about intercepts and sophisticated spying at all. They just tracked Sheikh Mohammed down with good old fashioned police work. "The F.B.I. in Pakistan had a minor role, but these claims that it's a major victory for U.S. espionage don't really give a true picture to folks here at home in the States. All this chest-beating about getting the guy distracts attention from the fact that we just don't have enough investigative manpower and resources on the ground over there. The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. and the White House should stop spinning reality and start putting more brains and muscle into the field." The charge that U.S. spies are not getting the support they require is hotly debated in Washington, but there's little argument over one irritating -- and threatening -- statistic: two-thirds of the al Qaeda leadership remains at large. Should terrorist cells strike at U.S. and other western nations during combat operations in Iraq, the White House will be bombarded with still more accusations that it has gone too long on attacking Saddam and far too short on counter-terrorism. Says one foreign policy consultant to the U.S. military, who spoke to Maclean's on condition of anonymity, "it's undeniable, I'm afraid, that this administration has lost focus. The president and his people have bet every dollar of their political capital on getting a perfect outcome in Iraq -- disarmament, regime change, spreading of democracy, the works. It's not a dream scenario, it'd be more like a miracle. "The truth is that once the military gets beyond the brute force stuff, we usually fail pretty miserably. We just haven't got the light touch. Post-conflict, if you can't be successful in Afghanistan, I can't imagine we're going to be successful in Iraq." Yet the drumbeat grows louder, and public opinion in the U.S., though wavering, continues to provide President Bush with a workable edge over his critics. The foreign affairs consultant offers an explanation. "The country's coming out of shock over 9/11, but the anger's still there. People really don't want to hear about allies talking the (Bush war) plan down. They want a result, a tangible clear result. It's just too bad we're going looking for one in Iraq." |